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THE CASE AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE IN 
IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Duke Law Journal’s fifty-first annual administrative law 
symposium examines the future of Chevron deference—the command that 
a reviewing court defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute the agency administers. In the lead article, Professors 
Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the Supreme Court should 
narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude interpretations made via 
administrative adjudication. Building on their framing, this Article 
presents an in-depth case study of immigration adjudication and argues 
that this case against Chevron has perhaps its greatest force when it comes 
to immigration. That is because much of Chevron’s theory for 
congressional delegation and judicial deference—including agency 
expertise, deliberative process, and even political accountability—
collapses in the immigration adjudication context.  
  As for potential reform, Professors Hickman and Nielson 
understandably focus on the Supreme Court. This Article also explores that 
judicial option but argues that it is a mistake to focus just on courts when 
it comes to immigration law and policy. The political branches can and 
should act to narrow Chevron’s domain. First, this proposal should be part 
of any comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Second, the 
Executive Branch can and should embrace this reform internally—by not 
seeking Chevron deference in immigration adjudication and by turning to 
rulemaking instead of adjudication to make major immigration policy. 
Shifting the immigration policymaking default from adjudication to 
rulemaking is more consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to 
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leverage agency expertise, to engage in a deliberative process, and to 
increase political accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, we have seen a growing call, largely from those 
right of center, to eliminate Chevron1 deference—the command that federal 
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers so long 
as the statutory provision is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.2 Those calls arrived center stage during the March 2017 Senate 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Id. at 842–43. For a collection of these criticisms, see generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking 
Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018). Notably, 
scholarly criticisms of Chevron predate the current wave and have been lodged by scholars across the 
ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How 
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782–84 (2010) 
(outlining ten reasons why Chevron should be overruled); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (“The danger of 
Chevron’s song lies in its apparent obliviousness to the fundamental alterations it makes in our 
constitutional conception of the administrative state.”). 
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Judiciary Committee hearing on then-Judge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination to 
the Supreme Court. While serving on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch had penned 
a concurring opinion that questioned the constitutionality and wisdom of 
Chevron deference and suggested that “[m]aybe the time has come to face 
the [Chevron] behemoth.”3  
Chevron deference garnered nearly one hundred mentions at Gorsuch’s 
confirmation hearing.4 The senators’ opening statements are illustrative. 
Senator Dianne Feinstein proclaimed that Gorsuch’s apparent call to 
eliminate Chevron deference was an attack on science and “would 
dramatically affect how laws passed by Congress can be properly carried 
out” by federal agencies.5 Senator Amy Klobuchar asserted that Chevron’s 
demise “would have titanic real-world implications on all aspects of our 
everyday lives. Countless rules could be in jeopardy, protections that matter 
to the American people would be compromised, and there would be 
widespread uncertainty.”6 “[T]o those who subscribe to President Trump’s 
extreme view,” Senator Al Franken declared, “Chevron is the only thing 
standing between them and what the President’s chief strategist Steve 
Bannon called the ‘deconstruction of the administrative state,’ which is 
shorthand for gutting any environmental or consumer protection measure 
that gets in the way of corporate profit margins.”7 In total, eight senators 
mentioned Gorsuch’s views on Chevron deference during their questioning.8 
Simply put, the potential demise of Chevron deference was a core talking 
point against Gorsuch’s elevation to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Gorsuch has since finished his third full year on the Supreme 
Court. Yet the Chevron revolution the senators feared has not materialized. 
To the contrary, in Kisor v. Wilkie,9 the Court rejected a challenge to 
eliminate Auer10 deference—a sibling doctrine regarding judicial deference 
 
 3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 4. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. passim (2017) [hereinafter Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing] (mentioning the word “Chevron” 
ninety-four times).  
 5. Id. at 6–7 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 6. Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 7. Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Al Franken, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 8. See id. at 86–87 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. at 90–91, 271–73 (statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary ); id. at 127–29 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 153–55, 302–03 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); id. at 159 (statement of 
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 174–76 (statement of Sen. Franken); 
id. at 201–02, 331–32 (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 216–17 
(statement of Sen. Mike Crapo, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 9. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 10. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
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to agency regulatory interpretations.11 Despite Chief Justice John Roberts’s 
suggestion that Kisor’s reaffirmance of Auer did not “touch upon 
the . . . question” of Chevron deference,12 we do not expect the Court to 
overturn Chevron any time soon. In our view, Auer was more susceptible to 
a legal challenge than Chevron. Yet the Court did not overturn Auer when it 
had the chance. Chevron should be similarly safe. Nor do we expect 
Congress to eliminate Chevron deference—despite various legislative 
proposals to do so in recent years.13 
Although a wholesale reconsideration of Chevron deference is unlikely 
in the near future, this Article returns to the context that caused Gorsuch to 
express concerns about Chevron in the first place: immigration adjudication. 
In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,14 the Tenth Circuit confronted and rejected 
an agency statutory interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had embraced via 
agency adjudication.15 Gorsuch authored the opinion for the Tenth Circuit16 
and published a separate concurrence to observe that “[t]here’s an elephant 
in the room”: Chevron deference.17  
That elephant remains in the immigration courtroom. This Article seeks 
to return the debate about Chevron deference to this immigration context. To 
do so, it builds on the lead article in this Symposium, in which Professors 
Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the Supreme Court should 
narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude, or at a minimum reduce, judicial 
deference to agency statutory interpretations established in an administrative 
adjudication.18 Further, this Article draws from important scholarship on 
immigration adjudication to reassess the empirical and theoretical 
underpinnings of Chevron’s domain in immigration adjudication. 
 
 11. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422–23. To be sure, Justice Gorsuch disagreed with the 5–4 majority and 
penned the principal concurring opinion, in which he argued that Auer should be replaced with the less 
deferential Skidmore standard. Id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (preferring the standard set out in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 12. Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (casting the deciding vote to uphold Auer 
deference under stare decisis). 
 13. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (amending 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to eliminate Auer and Chevron deference); Separation of 
Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. tit. II, § 202 (2017) (same); see also Christopher J. Walker, 
Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 667–69 (2017) (discussing 
legislative efforts to eliminate or narrow Auer and Chevron deference).  
 14. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 15. Id. at 1144–46. 
 16. Id. at 1143. 
 17. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 18. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 938 
(2021). 
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Ultimately, the case against Chevron deference in administrative 
adjudication has perhaps its greatest force when it comes to immigration 
adjudication.19 
On closer examination, the theoretical foundations for Chevron 
deference crumble in this context. Chevron’s core rationale for congressional 
delegation and judicial deference—agency expertise—is particularly weak 
in immigration adjudication. Unlike in other regulatory contexts, the 
statutory ambiguities immigration adjudicators address seldom implicate 
scientific or other technical expertise. The second leading and related 
rationale—deliberative process—is even weaker here than in other 
adjudicative contexts. After all, immigration adjudication is on the fringe of 
the “new world of agency adjudication.”20 It is not formal adjudication under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and therefore lacks many of the 
signature procedural protections afforded in APA-governed formal 
adjudication.21 The third central rationale—political accountability—may at 
first blush seem compelling in immigration adjudication, due to the attorney 
general’s final decisionmaking authority.22 Building on Professors Hickman 
and Nielson’s framing, however, we argue that agency-head review is 
necessary yet insufficient for Chevron’s accountability theory. The theory 
should encompass a robust public engagement component, with public 
notice and an opportunity to be heard for those—beyond the parties in the 
adjudication itself—who would be affected by the agency’s statutory 
interpretation. Agency adjudication seldom provides that, and perhaps even 
less so in immigration adjudication. 
 
 19. Throughout this Article and unless otherwise noted, we use “agency adjudication” or 
“administrative adjudication” as shorthand for any agency adjudication where a hearing is required by 
statute or regulation. In other words, we are grouping together what in the literature are referred to as 
Type A (APA-governed formal agency adjudication) and Type B (formal-like agency adjudication where 
a hearing is required by another statute or regulation) adjudications, and we are expressly not discussing 
or comparing less formal Type C adjudications where no hearing is required. See Christopher J. Walker 
& Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 153–57 
(2019) (discussing the Type A, B, and C categorizations of agency adjudication embraced by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States in Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 
94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016)). 
 20. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 154; id. at 143 (“The vast majority of agency 
adjudications today, however, do not look like APA formal adjudication. Instead, agencies regulate using 
adjudicatory means that still require evidentiary hearings but do not embrace all of the features set forth 
in the APA.”). 
 21. See id. at 172. For the APA’s formal procedural requirements, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 (2018), 
and Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–53, 150 tbl.1. For more on how immigration 
adjudication differs from APA-governed formal adjudication, see MICHAEL ASIMOW, FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 151–58 (2019). 
 22. But see Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 173 (“[T]he Attorney General only reviews 
cases on a discretionary basis.”). 
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To be sure, this is not an argument for eliminating Chevron deference 
entirely in the immigration context. Others have advanced largely 
substantive arguments against Chevron when it comes to interpretations that 
infringe on liberty, including in the refugee and asylum context.23 Here, the 
argument against Chevron, by contrast, is largely procedural, not 
substantive. Chevron deference should apply in the immigration context only 
to agency statutory interpretations promulgated through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. The lessdeferential Skidmore24 standard should 
govern interpretations advanced in immigration adjudication.25 As one of us 
(Wadhia) has explored in calling for rulemaking for deferred action in 
immigration, there is tremendous value in national uniformity and in public-
facing deliberative process when crafting immigration law and policy—both 
of which would be inhibited if courts, as opposed to agencies, take the 
leading role.26 In other words, rulemaking should be the predominant 
administrative tool for implementing Congress’s immigration laws and for 
making immigration policy at the agency level.  
There remains the issue of how to effectuate this reform. Professors 
Hickman and Nielson understandably focus on the Supreme Court,27 and this 
Article also discusses stare decisis and judicial action. But for immigration 
law and policy, it is a mistake to focus on just federal courts. The political 
branches can and should act to narrow Chevron’s domain. First, the proposal 
presented here should be part of any comprehensive immigration reform 
legislation. As Professor Kent Barnett details, Congress has codified lesser 
deference standards for certain agency actions28—it should do so in 
immigration adjudication, too. Second, the Executive Branch can and should 
embrace this reform internally by not seeking Chevron deference in 
immigration adjudication and by turning to rulemaking instead of 
adjudication to make major immigration policy. The Biden administration 
 
 23. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 495, 532–33 
(2019) (arguing for “a physical liberty exception to Chevron” in the immigration context); Maureen A. 
Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 
135, 189–92 (2019) (discouraging application of Chevron deference to withholding and asylum 
decisions). 
 24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 25. See id. at 140 (instructing courts to give “weight” to an agency’s statutory interpretation based 
“upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control”). 
 26. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 85–87, 152–55 (2015) [hereinafter WADHIA, BEYOND 
DEPORTATION].  
 27. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 938. 
 28. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2015). 
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should embrace this reform, and senators of both parties should extract this 
commitment from the next attorney general nominee as part of the 
confirmation process.  
In other words, both political branches should work to shift the default 
from adjudication to rulemaking for immigration policymaking at the agency 
level. Legislatively eliminating Chevron deference for immigration 
adjudication should encourage more notice-and-comment rulemaking. But 
to successfully flip the default to rulemaking, the Executive Branch likely 
must also commit to the reform internally. As detailed in this Article, this 
shift from adjudication to rulemaking would be more consistent with the 
theoretical foundations of the Chevron doctrine—to better leverage agency 
expertise, to engage in a more deliberative process, and to increase political 
accountability. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
immigration adjudication, including how the Supreme Court has applied 
Chevron deference in the immigration context. Part II critically examines 
Chevron’s theoretical foundations as applied to the immigration adjudication 
context. Part III explores the mechanics of narrowing Chevron’s domain to 
exclude agency statutory interpretations advanced via immigration 
adjudication—suggesting potential reforms by all three branches of the 
federal government. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
Immigration decisions are made every day by a universe of people and 
agencies. An officer employed by the Department of State and situated in a 
U.S. consulate or embassy abroad may decide if a foreign national is eligible 
for immigration status and entitled to a visa.29 A line officer from 
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) may issue a supervision 
order to an immigrant during a routine check-in.30 An adjudicator in U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) may interview a couple 
and grant adjustment of status (a “green card”) to the immigrant 
 
 29. Consular Affairs by the Numbers, U.S. DEP’T STATE (2020), https://travel.state.gov/content/
dam/travel/CA-By-the-Number-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EW-LFYU]; see also U.S. Visas, U.S. 
DEP’T STATE, BUREAU CONSULAR AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas.html [https://
perma.cc/U47F-PSNR]. 
 30. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF 
TRUMP 48 (2019) [hereinafter WADHIA, BANNED]; Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T (last updated Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/detention-management [https://perma.cc/L9KZ-
VV92]. 
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beneficiary.31 An inspector at Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) may 
deport a father who arrives at a land border without papers.32 ICE, CBP, and 
USCIS are units in the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and their 
employees are responsible for making a range of immigration enforcement 
and benefits decisions with significant impacts on immigrants and their 
families.33  
In fact, the majority of removal (deportation) orders issued each year 
are made by DHS officers through what one of us (Wadhia) has coined a 
“speedy deportation.”34 Speedy deportation refers to three programs under 
the INA that authorize DHS to remove noncitizens without a hearing or 
review before an immigration judge. These programs are formally called 
administrative removal, expedited removal, and reinstatement of removal.35 
Last year, the Supreme Court upheld the statutory bars to habeas review of 
one of these programs, expedited removal, against a Suspension Clause 
constitutional challenge—with Justice Sonia Sotomayor declaring in dissent 
that the “decision handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its 
constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical 
component of the separation of powers.”36  
Immigration adjudications are also made by employees of the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). DOJ houses the immigration court system 
known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).37 
Immigration judges at EOIR preside over removal hearings at which a 
 
 31. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://
www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-of-status [https://
perma.cc/XJP6-WBEB]; Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green-
card [https://perma.cc/S6LG-RQ8L]. 
 32. See Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/
border-security/along-us-borders [https://perma.cc/L33U-3TVU] (describing detection of undocumented 
immigrants as a duty of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol). 
 33. See Operational and Support Components, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (last updated Dec. 3, 
2020), https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://perma.cc/YC87-6TBJ].  
 34. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 80; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed 
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 passim (2014). For another scholar’s 
discussion of expedited deportations, see Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching 
for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 337, 341 (2018), and Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Opinion, Deport, Not 
Court? The U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma.cc/
UK7K-Q4K4].  
 35. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 79.  
 36. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1993 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 37. About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/TNZ3-WTG7].  
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noncitizen—known as the respondent—is charged with a violation of 
immigration law and a number of other hearings, such as bond hearings and 
reviews of fear determinations made by DHS.38 As Part I.A details, the 
attorney general and the BIA exercise agency appellate review over 
immigration judge decisions. 
This Article focuses on one strand of immigration adjudication: 
removal proceedings before DOJ’s immigration courts, the BIA, and the 
attorney general. Part I.A provides an overview of that system, and Part I.B 
explains how federal courts have applied Chevron deference to statutory 
interpretations embraced via immigration adjudication. 
A. Immigration Adjudication Process 
Most immigration cases at EOIR involve people in removal 
proceedings,39 which are triggered when a charging document called the 
Notice to Appear (“NTA”) is filed with the immigration court.40 A number 
of DHS employees—attorneys and nonattorneys alike—can issue an NTA.41 
The NTA contains information that includes notice about the location and 
time of a court proceeding and the reasons a person is alleged to be in 
violation of immigration law.42  
In removal proceedings, trial attorneys from ICE represent the 
government and act as “prosecutors.”43 Respondent noncitizens represent 
themselves pro se or are represented by an attorney or accredited 
representative.44 Removal hearings are adversarial, but the proceedings 
 
 38. PLANNING, ANALYSIS & STAT. DIV. OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 4–6, 15 tbl.6 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/6UN5-4WJ2].  
 39. In fiscal year 2018, 182,010 of the 195,213 cases (93.2 percent) completed by the EOIR 
involved removal proceedings. Id. at 12 tbl.5.  
 40. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13–1003.15 (2020); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL & CTR. FOR 
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., NOTICES TO APPEAR: LEGAL 
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES 2 (2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/76BC-Y3KM].  
 41. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (listing the types of immigration officers with authority to issue a 
Notice to Appear); CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L. & 
COMM’N ON IMMIGR. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR: 
IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 13–18 (2013), https://
pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
96FH-ZWMZ]. 
 42. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2018) (listing 
information required in a Notice to Appear); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15.  
 43. See Attorney, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last updated Aug. 5, 2020), https://
www.ice.gov/careers/attorney [https://perma.cc/5HYT-FF84]. 
 44. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5.  
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themselves are “civil,” not “criminal.”45 Unlike the criminal justice system, 
in removal proceedings there is no right to a grand jury, speedy trial, court-
appointed counsel, or mandated timeframe during which an immigrant must 
see a judge.46  
The immigration court has two dockets: one for respondents outside of 
detention and a second for those detained.47 The adjudicative process begins 
with the “master calendar hearing,” when an immigration judge may ask the 
respondent if she needs more time to find counsel or to respond to the charges 
of the NTA.48 If the respondent concedes to removability or the immigration 
judge finds the same, the next stage of removal proceedings often involves 
the respondent applying for relief from removal. Respondents seek such 
relief at a stage in the removal process known as the “individual merits 
hearing,” or the “merits hearing.” These are evidentiary hearings at which 
both the government and the respondent may present evidence and witness 
testimony, including testimony of the respondent herself.49 The various 
forms of relief act as “defenses” to removal and include asylum, cancellation 
of removal, and waivers from inadmissibility.50 In removal proceedings, the 
 
 45. This technical distinction is the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (noting the displacement of “the civil regulatory model of immigration law” with 
a “criminal justice model”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated 
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 289, 289 (2008) (“[R]emoval and traditional criminal proceedings . . . can be indistinguishable but 
for the relative lack of procedural protections and the often graver liberty interest at stake in the former.”); 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1822, 1824–26 (2011) (critiquing the civil–
criminal line in the preemption context); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: 
HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM FALLS SHORT OF AMERICAN IDEALS OF JUSTICE 1–2 (2013), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twotwosystemsofjust.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6WS-RVQD] (“Although immigration law is formally termed ‘civil,’ Congress has 
progressively expanded the number of crimes that may render an individual deportable, and immigration 
law violations often lead to criminal prosecutions.”).  
 46. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 7–10; WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 
26, at 52; Legomsky, supra note 45, at 511–18. 
 47. Detention Management, supra note 30. 
 48. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REPRESENTING CLIENTS AT THE MASTER CALENDAR HEARING 
1 (2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rep_clnts_mstr_cal_hearing-20181220.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36TK-P3SM]; Immigration Judge Master Calendar Checklist for Pro Se Respondents, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/924091/
download [https://perma.cc/E7EF-LTC6]. 
 49. See INA § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2018) (prescribing the form of these proceedings); see also 
OFF. OF THE CHIEF IMMIGR. JUDGE OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 80 (2020) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL], https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download [https://perma.cc/9Y9F-6APZ]. 
 50. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in 
Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 377 (2020). 
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respondent bears the burden of proving eligibility for relief.51 For example, 
an asylum seeker must prove to an immigration judge that she has suffered 
persecution or has a fear of future persecution because of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.52 
While immigrants in removal proceedings speak multiple languages, all 
forms they must fill out are available in English only.53  
The INA provides a statutory right to counsel in removal proceedings 
at no expense to the government.54 Many immigrants in removal proceedings 
are unable to access or pay for a lawyer and so must navigate the process 
without one.55 Detained immigrants are dramatically more likely to face 
immigration court alone.56 Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
does not attach in these proceedings, the Fifth Amendment right to due 
process applies, such that removal proceedings must be fundamentally fair.57 
The INA provides additional rights during removal proceedings, including 
the right to present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses 
and evidence.58 In removal proceedings, respondents also have the right to 
an interpreter.59 
Immigration judges play a significant role during removal proceedings. 
They ask questions of the parties. They make decisions about whether to 
 
 51. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (c)(4)(a). 
 52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2020). 
 53. See, e.g., EOIR-29, Notificación de Apelación Ante la Junta de Apelaciones de Inmigración 
Sobre una Decisión de un Oficial de Inmigración, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated June 
12, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/es/eoir-29 [https://perma.cc/773P-EEUE] (providing only English-
language forms on the Spanish-language website). 
 54. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362. 
 55. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (finding “that only 37% of immigrants had counsel” in immigration 
proceedings from 2007 to 2012); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 42, 46 (2010) (noting detainees’ limited access to attorneys (citing Margaret H. Taylor, 
Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. 
L. REV. 1647, 1651–52 (1997))). 
 56. Who Is Represented in Immigration Court?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/485 [https://perma.cc/9AYU-74HB]. 
 57. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Note, A Second Chance: 
The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1544, 1548–49 (2007) (collecting cases on the lack of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in removal 
proceedings). 
 58. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). 
 59. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 64; Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Language Access 
in the Immigration System: A Primer, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://
bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/language-access-in-the-immigration-system-a-primer [https://perma.cc/
YQG5-GUR9].  
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continue, terminate, or close a proceeding.60 They also decide a respondent’s 
eligibility for relief from removal, which may be delivered in writing or 
orally.61 Once the judge hands down her decision, the respondent or ICE trial 
attorney may appeal to the BIA.62 Unlike immigration courts, which are 
sprinkled throughout the country, the BIA is housed in one building in Falls 
Church, Virginia.63 Importantly, appeals must be made within thirty days of 
the immigration judge’s decision.64 Because a formal transcript of the 
hearing can be mailed later than thirty days after the decision, the respondent 
and counsel, if any, must pay close attention during the oral hearing.  
Appeals to the BIA are common. And yet, most decisions are not 
appealed by either party.65 For respondents, filing an appeal can be expensive 
or could mean that they remain in detention pending appeal. Absent an 
appeal, the immigration judge’s decision is “final” and may result in the 
immigrant obtaining relief or a formal order of removal.66 If an appeal is 
filed, a decision by the BIA to affirm a removal order constitutes the final 
order of removal.67 At this point, the BIA may publish its decision as 
precedential, which means it is legally binding on other immigration 
adjudications.68 More often, BIA decisions are unpublished and thus 
nonprecedential69—and issued by a single judge or panel without the same 
 
 60. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10(b), 1240.12 (2020). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1–1003.8 (describing the process to appeal to the BIA from 
immigration judges’ decisions in removal proceedings). 
 63. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated 
May 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/DWK3-
SK8N]. 
 64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15. 
 65. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 7 fig.2 (indicating 195,571 matters 
completed in fiscal year 2018), with id. at 35 fig.27 (noting 49,522 appeals received by the BIA the same 
year). 
 66. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (implementing INA § 101(a)(47)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (2018)). 
 67. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1241.1. 
 68. Id. § 103.10(b) (“Selected decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney General, 
and decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . shall serve as precedents in all proceedings 
involving the same issue or issues.”). 
 69. Of the 29,788 cases completed by the BIA in 2018, only twenty-three resulted in precedential 
opinions. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 35 fig.27 (indicating the number of 
cases completed in 2018), with Volume 27, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated 
June 12, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-27 [https://perma.cc/AMT9-32JF] (listing 
precedential opinions).  
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binding nature.70 When making decisions, BIA members are required by 
regulation to exercise “independent judgment and discretion.”71  
The regulations allow the attorney general to certify a decision by the 
BIA and issue a new decision.72 The reality is that attorney general decisions 
are legally binding,73 with little to no regard for the stature of precedent. To 
illustrate, in Matter of L-E-A-,74 then-Attorney General William Barr 
announced a new position for asylum claims based on family relationships.75 
In general, asylum applicants must show they have suffered persecution in 
the past or have a well-founded fear of future persecution for one of five 
reasons: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.76 And historically, the federal government and 
federal courts have recognized that family can be a particular social group.77 
Barr was critical of the BIA’s 2017 decision in Matter of L-E-A- because it 
“improperly recognized the respondent’s father’s immediate family as a 
‘particular social group.’”78  
The case involved a Mexican national and citizen who feared 
persecution from a criminal gang because of his relationship to his father.79 
His father operated a neighborhood general store targeted by a drug cartel.80 
The respondent’s father refused to allow the drug cartel to operate out of his 
general store, which the respondent believed to be the reason his father 
 
 70. See, e.g., David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1205 
(2016) (noting the BIA’s more recent practice of permitting single members to issue single-sentence 
affirmances with no reasoning and therefore no precedential value); see also infra note 179 (discussing 
number of precedential decisions issued in the Trump administration). 
 71. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 
 72. Id. § 103.10(c). 
 73. Id. § 103.10(b). 
 74. In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (Att’y Gen. 2019). 
 75. Id. at 581. 
 76. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 77. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “every 
circuit to have considered the question has held that family ties can provide a basis for asylum” and 
collecting BIA opinions which held the same); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and 
immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 
(B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that “membership in a particular social group” can be based on “kinship ties”), 
abrogated on other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), as recognized in In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1985) 
(finding a Somalian subclan to be a “particular social group” linked by kinship ties and “identifiable as a 
group based upon linguistic commonalities”).  
 78. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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became a target.81 Barr did not agree that the respondent’s family 
relationship qualified as a “social group,” and he held that “most nuclear 
families are not inherently socially distinct and therefore do not qualify as 
‘particular social groups.’”82 Critics of Matter of L-E-A- argued that Barr’s 
decision undermined the body of caselaw that recognized individuals like the 
respondent.83 And yet, Barr’s decision is now legally binding and informs 
and limits the ability for asylum seekers to seek protection based on a family 
relationship. 
Attorney general certification rulings pervaded decisionmaking during 
the Trump administration. As of this writing, there have been fourteen 
attorney general certification rulings.84 Fourteen might appear to be a small 
number, but equally important to the number of certifications is the scope of 
the decisions and erosion of BIA precedent. Professor Richard Frankel 
showcases how certification spiked during the Trump administration and 
argues these decisions should not receive Chevron deference.85 Says 
Professor Frankel: 
[The Attorney General] has imposed new restrictions that deprive victims 
of domestic violence and gang threats from seeking asylum, revoked the 
authority of immigration judges to put deportation cases on hold or grant 
continuances while non-citizens await decisions on applications for relief 
from deportation, and ordered increased imprisonment of non-citizens and 
 
 81. Id. at 583. 
 82. Id. at 581. 
 83. See supra note 77; see also Jeffrey S. Chase, L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?, JEFFREY 
S. CHASE BLOG (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-a-how-much-did-
the-ag-change [https://perma.cc/SW62-AUUX] (criticizing Barr’s attempt to overhaul decades’ worth of 
caselaw).  
 84. Since 2017, the attorney general has issued precedential decisions in fourteen certified cases: In 
re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018); 
In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 
(Att’y Gen. 2018); In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581; In re 
Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664 (Att’y Gen. 2019); In re Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674 
(Att’y Gen. 2019); In re R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re O‑F‑A‑S‑, 28 I. & N. Dec. 
35 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re Reyes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 52 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 
84 (Att’y Gen. 2020); and In re Negusie, 28 I. & N. 120 (Att’y Gen. 2020).  
 85. Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions 
Should Not Receive Chevron Deference 5, 7, 33 (Drexel Univ. Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 2019-W-02), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492115 [https://perma.cc/3RXT-B726]. 
Professor Frankel is not alone in his concerns. See, e.g., WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 58–59 
(discussing increased use of the certification power under the Trump administration); Bijal Shah, The 
Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129, 131 (2017) 
(discussing the disruptive nature of the certification power and arguing that its use undermines uniformity 
within the law). Part II returns to Professor Frankel’s arguments against Chevron deference to attorney 
general decisions. 
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reduced immigration judges’ authority to grant bond, among other 
rulings.86  
Similarly, Professor Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer and attorney Hillary Rich 
have argued against Chevron deference in connection with Matter of A-B-.87 
There, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision involving an 
asylum seeker who claimed she was persecuted on account of her 
membership in the purported particular social group of “Salvadoran women 
who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have 
children in common.”88 In adopting Matter of A-B-, Sessions also overruled 
Matter of A-R-C-G-,89 a precedential decision from 2014.90 Building on more 
than a decade of jurisprudence, Matter of A-R-C-G- was a signature 
precedential decision that clearly recognized domestic violence as a basis for 
asylum.91 Professor Kelley-Widmer and Rich argue, for instance, that Matter 
of A-B- fails Chevron’s first step because its focus on the potential size of 
the social group and the role of private actors as the source of persecution 
are contrary to unambiguous congressional intent.92 They also argue the 
decision fails Chevron’s second step “because it contravenes Congressional 
intent regarding flexibility.”93  
B. Judicial Review and Chevron Deference 
Immigrants can challenge final removal decisions from the BIA or the 
attorney general by filing a petition for review in a federal circuit court. But 
there is a catch. The INA categorically bars certain cases from federal court 
review.94 Judicial review is precluded for those with removal orders 
stemming from certain criminal activity or the denial of relief from removal 
the INA has categorized as discretionary.95 Similar to the trend in 
administrative appeals to the BIA, the number of immigrants who could seek 
 
 86. Frankel, supra note 85, at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
 87. In re A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (Att’y Gen. 2021); Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer & Hillary Rich, A 
Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, “Particular Social Group,” and Chevron, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
345, 351–53, 363 (2019) (discussing A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316). 
 88. Id. at 351–53, 363 (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321). 
 89. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316. 
 90. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
 91. See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93 (holding “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship” can be a particular social group “dependent upon the particular facts 
and evidence in a case”).  
 92. Kelley-Widmer & Rich, supra note 87, at 394. 
 93. Id. at 399.  
 94. INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2018). 
 95. Id. See generally Wadhia, supra note 50 (surveying the various ways the government uses 
discretion in the immigration context). 
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federal court review far exceeds the number of immigrants who actually do 
seek such review.96 Again, the expense of filing a petition, access to legal 
counsel, and the narrow, thirty-day window to file the petition are some of 
the barriers that limit federal court review.97 Thus, any project assessing the 
intra-agency effects of Chevron deference in immigration adjudication is 
limited by the fact that most cases never make it to federal court. Notably, 
cases involving asylum, legal questions, or constitutional claims are among 
those accepted by federal courts, with federal circuit courts having exclusive 
jurisdiction over removal orders.98  
Just three years after deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca99 applied the Chevron deference framework to a BIA 
statutory interpretation.100 Yet the Court ultimately did not defer to the 
agency, finding instead that the statutory text unambiguously foreclosed the 
BIA’s interpretation.101 In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia 
argued that “there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion 
of whether the interpretation is entitled to [Chevron] deference.”102 Since 
Cardoza-Fonseca was decided, as Professors Hickman and Nielson 
document,103 the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron deference 
framework to seven BIA statutory interpretations. The agency won because 
of Chevron deference in three cases.104 And the Court refused to defer in 
three cases because the statute was unambiguous105 and in a fourth because 
the agency asserted it had no discretion to interpret the statute differently.106  
In one immigration adjudication case, a dozen years after Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[i]t is clear that principles of 
 
 96. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 70, at 1196 (“Petitions for review of final removal orders are 
rare events, and reversal of the BIA’s decisions is even rarer. Before the 2002 streamlining at the BIA, 
fewer than 5% of all cases resulted in a petition for review” in a federal circuit court, “and of those, fewer 
than 1 in 10 resulted in a remand.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 97. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: HOW TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW 5 (2015), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/how_to_file_a_
petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6F-XS7D]. 
 98. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
 99. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 100. Id. at 446–48.  
 101. Id. at 448–49. 
 102. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 103. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, app. at 1000–13. 
 104. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56–58 (2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 76 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring in the judgment); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012); INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–33 (1999).  
 105. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 
1562, 1572 (2017); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015). 
 106. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514, 521 (2009).  
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Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.”107 In other 
words, the Court has not treated immigration adjudication as exceptional for 
the purposes of Chevron deference. Instead, it insists that the same doctrinal 
framework applicable to other agency statutory interpretations applies with 
equal force to BIA statutory interpretations. The story among the federal 
courts of appeals is similar. In a recent study covering roughly a decade of 
Chevron decisions, the circuit courts reviewed 386 BIA statutory 
interpretations, upholding the BIA’s interpretation 70.2 percent of the 
time.108 
II.  CHEVRON’S PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION 
IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
The Chevron decision has been on the books for more than thirty-five 
years and is cited by more than 90,000 sources on Westlaw, but its theoretical 
underpinnings remain disputed and underdeveloped.109 To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has grounded Chevron in congressional delegation—“a 
‘presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather 
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.’”110 And this delegation theory, which the Court has suggested 
though never fully developed, is grounded in the four rationales of expertise, 
deliberative process, political accountability, and national uniformity of 
law.111 In other words, in the Court’s view, these are the four core reasons 
why Congress delegates—or at least should delegate—policymaking or law-
implementation authority to federal agencies, rather than courts. Likewise, 
these rationales are also why federal agencies should receive judicial 
 
 107. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 
 108. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36 
(2017).  
 109. When referencing the theory of Chevron deference, we refer to both the reasons the Supreme 
Court offered for deference in the Chevron decision itself and the various theoretical justifications for the 
Chevron doctrine that have since emerged in the literature and subsequent judicial decisions. See, e.g., 
Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–82 (2018) (providing an overview of the theory of Chevron deference and 
some of its criticisms); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–91 (2008) 
(surveying rationales for Chevron deference). 
 110. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (quoting 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)). 
 111. See Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1475–82 (exploring these four rationales of Chevron 
deference). 
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deference, within the bounds of reasonableness, for how they interpret these 
delegation-conferring statutory ambiguities. 
This Part interrogates these four delegation values in the context of 
immigration adjudication. As the Chevron Court instructed, this analysis is 
necessarily comparative—that is, it involves weighing whether these values 
are better realized by agencies or courts. Because the argument here is that 
immigration agencies should receive Chevron deference in rulemaking but 
not adjudication, the analysis must also compare these two modes of agency 
action. This Part begins with, and focuses most on, the values of comparative 
expertise and deliberative process, as they are particularly lacking on the 
agency side in the context of immigration adjudication. This Part then turns 
briefly to the other two rationales of political accountability and uniformity 
in law. 
A. Expertise 
The predominant delegation theory that motivates Chevron deference 
is the comparative expertise held by federal agencies—as compared to 
courts—to fill gaps in statutes the agencies administer. Concluding that 
“[j]udges are not experts in the field,” the Chevron Court distinguished the 
role of judges from the expertise held by federal agencies.112 As Professor 
Adam Cox explains in the immigration context, “Chevron deference is often 
defended on the ground that administrative agencies have greater expertise 
and more democratic accountability than courts.”113  
Although the Chevron Court itself did not engage in a robust discussion 
of this expertise theory, it did surmise that Congress perhaps “consciously 
desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those 
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision would be in a better position to do so.”114 In other words, expertise 
seems to refer to comparative policy expertise, including the scientific, 
technical, economic, or other subject-matter expertise relevant to filling gaps 
in statutes the particular agency administers.115 As attorney Paul Chaffin puts 
 
 112. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). See generally 
Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public Administration, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2013) (conceptualizing expertise and accountability based on institutional 
perspectives and the behavior of public administrations). 
 113. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1682 
(2007). Part II.C further discusses the accountability rationale. 
 114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 115. See, e.g., Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron 
Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525–41 (2013) (considering 
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it, “When agencies answer technical questions dealing with scientific or 
economic subject matter, courts are poorly positioned to second-guess those 
determinations. Judges typically do not have the extensive scientific 
background possessed by appointed experts in specialty agencies.”116 
Attorney Joel Cohen employs truck driving as an example: “Do we really 
want judges who have never driven a truck and know nothing much about 
truck driving making decisions about truck driving safety?”117 This 
conception of expertise as a rationale for congressional delegation finds 
empirical support from congressional drafters.118 
The agency’s familiarity with the legislative process and purposes that 
led to the statutory ambiguities at issue may also contribute to its expertise. 
As Justice Scalia wrote, “The cases, old and new, that accept administrative 
interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in question, their 
intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue, 
their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes.”119 
Justice Stephen Breyer has made a similar observation, noting that “[t]he 
agency that enforces the statute may have had a hand in drafting its 
provisions,” “may possess an internal history in the form of documents or 
‘handed-down oral tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a difficult 
phrase or provision,” and, with “its staff, in close contact with relevant 
legislators and staffs, likely understands current congressional views, which, 
in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior understandings.”120 
In the rulemaking context, Professor Sidney Shapiro has 
reconceptualized agency expertise as “craft expertise”—what he presents as 
 
BIA expertise and its implications for Chevron deference); Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–78 (arguing 
that agency expertise is not a strong rationale for Chevron deference in the immigration context). 
 116. Chaffin, supra note 115, at 532. 
 117. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Judges v. Bureaucrats: Who Should Defer to 
Whom?, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/two-judges-
explain-why-they-dont-buy-the-logic-of-chevron-deference.html [https://perma.cc/APC8-YQ5D]. 
 118. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 
1004, 1005 fig.11 (2013) (reporting that 93 percent of congressional drafters surveyed indicated an 
agency’s area of expertise mattered as to whether Congress intends for an agency to resolve a statutory 
ambiguity); accord Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 
1053 fig.10 (2015) (reporting similar findings from agency rule drafters). 
 119. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 514.  
 120. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 
(1986) (emphasis omitted); see also Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1377, 1382–97 (2017) (documenting the role of federal agencies in the legislative process). 
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the unique “institutional expertise of agencies.”121 This conception of 
expertise has two related features. First, agency officials of various 
backgrounds acquire through regulating certain expertise outside of their 
trained disciplines, which “facilitates a richer, discursive decision-making 
process in which persons trained in various disciplines interact with each 
other inside and outside of the agency to debate and dispute arguments and 
information put forward in the rulemaking process.”122 Second, agency 
officials “develop expertise in reconciling and accounting for conflicting 
evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and 
legal commands.”123 “This expertise is a ‘craft’ form of expertise,” Shapiro 
explains, “because it is learned more from experience than from formal 
knowledge and because it is beyond the disciplinary training of individual 
professionals.”124 
The following Sections explore these three conceptions of agency 
expertise in turn, finding that all three lack salience in the immigration 
adjudication context.  
1. Scientific or Technical Expertise.  In many regulatory contexts, it is 
quite easy to discern the scientific or technical expertise an agency can 
leverage to fill the gaps in its statutory mandates. Environmental, energy, 
infrastructure, financial services, and food and drug law come immediately 
to mind. Yet, as Professor Hickman observes, “other areas of administrative 
law where Chevron regularly applies, such as immigration . . . , do not 
require scientific or other technical training.”125  
Indeed, Professor Maureen Sweeney effectively contrasts the role of 
technical or scientific expertise at the EPA, the agency at issue in Chevron 
itself, with the lack of any such expertise required in immigration 
adjudication: 
  The expertise required to interpret the INA, however, does not require 
familiarity with technical or scientific information, nor with the workings 
of an industry, nor even, for the most part, with the mechanics of 
 
 121. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure To Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem 
and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015). Professor Shapiro borrows and 
expands on Professor Jerry Mashaw’s observation that some of the expertise in public administration 
“resides in what one might call the feel or craft of decisionmakers.” See id. at 1113 (quoting JERRY L. 
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 67 (1983)). 
 122. Id. at 1099. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1599 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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immigration enforcement. And though immigration decisions are 
sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign relations, the truth 
of the matter is that it is the very unusual case that affects anyone or 
anything other than the parties themselves. The vast majority of 
immigration cases require expertise, not in foreign affairs, but rather in the 
legal interpretation of a complex statutory and regulatory scheme. This 
demands expertise in legal analysis and the application of law to facts—
precisely the sort of expertise that federal courts have.126 
Sweeney extensively explores the lack of scientific or technical expertise 
implicated by the statutory ambiguities the BIA resolves.127 Without 
regurgitating that analysis here, the point is not that interpreting the INA 
would never benefit from expertise in immigration, human rights, foreign 
affairs, or related substantive fields. It just turns out, as Sweeney documents, 
that the vast majority of ambiguities in the INA concern purely legal 
questions, as opposed to those implicating some sort of substantive expertise. 
In fact, the agency’s own hiring requirements for adjudicators reveal 
the agency’s determination that such substantive experience is not required. 
For example, a typical announcement for a BIA member position from 2018 
describes the required experience as follows:  
Applicants must have a full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as a 
licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing formal 
hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the 
Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience involves cases 
in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a charging document (e.g., 
indictment or information) was issued by a court, a grand jury, or 
appropriate military authority. Qualifying administrative law experience 
involves cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental 
administrative body.128  
Job announcements for immigration judges similarly do not require any legal 
or policy expertise in immigration or foreign relations, or any other scientific 
or technical expertise.129 Either litigation or administrative law experience is 
 
 126. Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–75; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the 
Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 806 (1997). 
 127. See Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–78.  
 128. E.g., Appellate Immigration Judge (Board Member), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/appellate-immigration-judge-board-member [https://perma.cc/
K5XY-ZH3S]  
 129. E.g., Immigration Judge, USA JOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/570894500 
[https://perma.cc/ZU5H-49D7]; Immigration Judge (Elizabeth), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-elizabeth-0 [https://perma.cc/H4WB-7ECX]. 
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required, but neither of those is the type of expertise that courts or scholars 
have recognized as grounds for Chevron deference.130 
Another way to assess if statutory interpretation via immigration 
adjudication requires some sort of technical or scientific expertise is to 
examine the circuit court cases in which the courts refused to apply Chevron 
deference. One of us (Wadhia) represents immigrants before agency 
adjudicators and federal courts and has followed a body of significant cases 
in the Third Circuit, where she regularly practices. Those immigration 
adjudication cases reveal the lack of expertise at the agency level.131 To 
illustrate how a court’s rejection of deference plays into agency expertise, 
consider the case of Da Silva v. Attorney General.132 Ludimilla Ramos Da 
Silva is a native of Brazil who was admitted to the United States in 1994 and 
married Aziim Leach, a U.S. citizen, in 2012.133 As the Third Circuit 
recounted, Leach “subjected Da Silva to emotional, psychological, and 
physical abuse throughout their marriage.”134 During one of Leach’s 
numerous extramarital affairs, Da Silva twice struck Leach’s mistress in the 
nose and pleaded guilty to two counts of assault.135  
The INA prohibits the cancellation of removal, under the Violence 
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), for an immigrant imprisoned for 180 or 
more days unless the “act or conviction was connected to the alien’s having 
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.”136 Despite the qualifying 
criminal offense, Da Silva argued she was entitled to protection under 
VAWA cancellation because her assault was “connected to” Leach’s abuse 
of her.137 The Third Circuit agreed with Da Silva and took the extraordinary 
step of refusing to remand to the agency.138 After all, the BIA decision in this 
case was nonprecedential and thus not entitled to Chevron deference; on 
 
 130. By pointing out the absence of immigration experience in job descriptions, we do not intend to 
suggest that all individuals who hold these positions lack immigration law experience or otherwise are 
not qualified to serve in these roles. Indeed, many former and sitting immigration judges and BIA 
members have extensive immigration expertise.  
 131. See, e.g., Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to use 
Chevron deference because the BIA’s conclusion that “failure to ‘include the specific date, time, or place 
of hearing’ in a NTA has no bearing on a notice recipient’s removability” conflicted with the INA’s plain 
text); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA 
requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” are not entitled to Chevron deference due to 
inconsistencies between the BIA requirement and past BIA decisions).  
 132. Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 133. Id. at 631. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 632. 
 136. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) (2018)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 638. 
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remand, the BIA could have reexamined the statutory question and issued a 
Chevron-eligible, precedential decision.  
But the Third Circuit refused to remand because it found the statutory 
language “connected to” unambiguous at Chevron’s first step, leaving the 
agency with no discretion.139 Relevant here, the Third Circuit also stated it 
was “not convinced that the Chevron framework applies here because 
interpreting ‘connected to’ does not implicate the BIA’s ‘expertise in a 
meaningful way’”; this was not the first time the Third Circuit had noted the 
BIA’s lack of expertise in interpreting the INA.140 Da Silva illustrates how 
technical expertise in immigration law—or any other special or scientific 
expertise—is not required to interpret most provisions of the INA in the 
context of adjudicating immigration removal cases. In the particular case of 
Da Silva, as in many others, the circuit court did not even rely on 
immigration sources to determine the definition of a statutory term.  
This observation is not merely anecdotal, nor is it limited to the Third 
Circuit. For example, one of us (Walker) has reviewed every circuit court 
decision that cites Chevron deference during an eleven-year period.141 A 
main takeaway from that empirical study is that circuit courts are less 
deferential to agency statutory interpretations made via immigration 
adjudication than in other adjudicative contexts. In particular, the BIA’s win 
rate—70.2 percent—was nearly fifteen percentage points less than the 
agency win rate for statutory interpretations embraced in all other hearing-
based agency adjudications in the dataset—84.7 percent.142 To be sure, it is 
not just about agency win rates, but whether the circuit court refuses to apply 
the Chevron deference framework at all: “[I]f the 386 immigration 
adjudications were removed from the formal adjudication category, the 
frequency of applying Chevron deference to formal adjudications would rise 
nearly ten percentage points to 85.2% and bring the formal formats into 
closer parity.”143  
2. Legislative Expertise.  There is another type of expertise that merits 
attention—namely, the expertise derived from the principal–agent 
 
 139. Id. at 634–35. 
 140. Id. at 635 (quoting Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 141. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 27. 
 142. Id. at 36.  
 143. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). These findings suggest that federal courts perhaps share this 
skepticism about the BIA’s substantive expertise in interpreting the INA. To be sure, these findings 
arguably also suggest that at least the circuit courts have already recalibrated the Chevron standard in the 
immigration adjudication context. Although assessing that argument exceeds this Article’s ambitions, 
courts “simply ignoring Chevron,” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., 
dissenting), is not a viable long-term solution in the immigration adjudication context. 
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relationship between Congress and the agency. As Professor Peter Strauss 
explains, “The enduring and multifaceted character of the agency’s 
relationship with Congress” is that the agency has comparative expertise “to 
distinguish reliably those considerations that served to shape the legislation, 
the legislative history wheat, from the more manipulative chaff.”144 If the 
goal of statutory interpretation is to be a faithful agent of Congress, agencies 
may have more expertise than courts, as they are more familiar with their 
statutory schemes and the legislative process that led to the ambiguities in 
those statutory mandates. As Professor Ganesh Sitaraman observes, the 
agency may well “have special insight into what the goals and intentions 
behind the legislation actually were, what the political and practical 
compromises were, and how [the members of Congress] thought about 
specific problems throughout the legislative process.”145 As one of us 
(Walker) explores elsewhere, federal agencies are substantially involved in 
the legislative drafting process and, indeed, play a role in drafting and 
reviewing nearly every legislative action that may affect them.146  
An agency, however, is a “they,” not an “it.” This specialized 
knowledge of legislative purpose and process should only matter, from a 
Chevron-expertise perspective, if the agency statutory interpreter possesses 
that expertise—either directly because the interpreter helped draft the statute 
or indirectly because the interpreter interacts with the agency personnel who 
possess that expertise, such as “the relevant agency rule drafters, the policy 
and legislative affairs teams, the scientists and economists where applicable, 
and so forth.”147 As one of us (Walker) has explored empirically, the 
interaction between relevant agency legislative experts and agency rule 
drafters who interpret statutes via rulemaking is often quite strong at many 
agencies, supporting the agency expertise rationale for Chevron deference in 
the rulemaking context.148  
With respect to agency adjudication, it is far less clear that the agency 
statutory interpreters have any access to the agency’s deep expertise in the 
statute’s legislative history, purposes, and processes. Most agency 
adjudicators, by statute or regulation, are prohibited from engaging in ex 
parte communications as part of most agencies’ strong separation of 
adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions—though Professor Michael 
 
 144. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: 
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347 (1990). 
 145. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129 (2015). 
 146. See Walker, supra note 120, at 1382–96 (reporting findings from an empirical study of the role 
of federal agencies in the legislative process). 
 147. Walker, supra note 118, at 1048. 
 148. See id. at 1034–48; Walker, supra note 120, at 1398–1405. 
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Asimow observes that “[e]x parte advice to decisionmakers by non-
adversarial agency staff members is customary and appropriate, so long as 
it does not violate the exclusive record principle by introducing new factual 
material.”149 In the immigration adjudication context, it does not appear that 
the BIA consults with agency legislative experts when interpreting the INA. 
It is doubtful that any such expertise-sharing activity takes place, which 
severely undercuts this second type of comparative agency expertise 
argument for Chevron deference. 
Unlike the BIA, where sharing expertise would be difficult in light of 
the agency’s current structure, the attorney general, at least in theory, should 
be able to leverage that expertise if desired. After all, the attorney general is 
the head of the agency and could structure the agency so as to interact with 
those legislative experts when exercising final decisionmaking authority in 
immigration adjudication. Yet, as far as we are aware, the attorney general 
does not consult with the agency’s legislative experts when exercising 
adjudicative authority. Indeed, a review of the attorney general’s referral-
adjudication decisions during the Trump administration reveals no express 
reliance on the agency’s legislative experts when interpreting the INA.150  
3. Craft Expertise.  Even Professor Shapiro’s conception of “craft 
expertise” seems to be lacking in the immigration adjudication context.151 To 
be sure, through adjudicating hundreds of cases, BIA members become 
specialists in interpreting the INA and immigration law and policy more 
generally. In that sense, compared to federal judges, these agency 
adjudicators may develop deeper “expertise in reconciling and accounting 
for conflicting evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political 
demands, and legal commands.”152  
As noted in Part I.A.1, however, most of the statutory ambiguities the 
BIA addresses in the INA do not implicate any technical or scientific 
expertise. These are not the type of questions that involve reconciling 
conflicting evidence or methodological approaches. They are generally legal 
questions. Nor, as discussed in Part I.A.2, do BIA members appear to interact 
with the rest of the experts at the agency. In other words, the current 
organizational structure for immigration adjudication does not engender “a 
richer, discursive decision-making process” where “persons trained in 
 
 149. ASIMOW, supra note 21, at 66 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 63–67 (detailing adjudicator 
prohibitions on intra- and extra-agency ex parte communications). 
 150. See supra note 84 (citing the fourteen attorney general certification rulings issued during the 
Trump administration). 
 151. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 152. Shapiro, supra note 121, at 1099. 
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various disciplines interact with each other inside and outside of the agency 
to debate and dispute arguments.”153 
Perhaps more importantly, the comparative analysis here is not just 
between the expertise of agencies and courts. Because this Article 
recommends narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to exclude such 
deference in adjudication yet preserve it for rulemaking, evaluating the 
comparative expertise exercised in those two modes of agency action is 
important. Due to organizational structure, the BIA is likely unable to 
exercise the agency’s collective and diverse expertise when adjudicating. In 
both adjudication and rulemaking, by contrast, the attorney general 
theoretically has the ability to leverage the agency’s collective expertise—
whether that is technical and scientific, legislative, or craft expertise—when 
interpreting statutes. So, at most, when it comes to the attorney general as 
agency adjudicator, the comparative value of the agency expertise for 
Chevron purposes is a wash as between adjudication and rulemaking.  
In reality, and as Part II.B details, because the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process is designed to leverage agency and public expertise, one 
would expect the attorney general to utilize agency expertise more in 
rulemaking than adjudication. When assessing the agency’s, or court’s, 
ability to leverage expertise, it is not just important whether the agency 
interpreters have access to the agency’s relevant expertise. Rather, it should 
matter whether the agency process is structured to leverage the agency’s 
expertise and, ideally, also the experience of outside experts, stakeholders, 
and the public. In other words, the deliberativeness of the process matters. 
Part II.B turns to this second theory for Chevron deference. 
B. Deliberative Process 
The Chevron decision itself did not focus on the value of the 
deliberative process in developing statutory interpretations. But subsequent 
decisions have underscored this comparative value for agencies—rather than 
courts—being the primary interpreters of statutes the agencies administer.154 
As this Section explains, the deliberative process theory for Chevron 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013) (“[T]he preconditions to deference 
under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority 
to administer the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency 
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding that not all agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities merit 
Chevron deference, but “recogniz[ing] a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in 
express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed”). 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2021  3:27 PM 
2021] CHEVRON FOR IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 1223 
deference is interrelated to the expertise theory and may just be another form 
of comparative expertise. After all, agencies have flexibility to engage in a 
process that incorporates all stakeholders, considers the various regulatory 
alternatives, and leverages the agency’s and the public’s expertise on the 
subject. Courts, by contrast, can only consider the cases before them, perhaps 
with limited amicus curiae input from others who are not parties to the 
litigation. 
But, as Professors Hickman and Nielson underscore, most of the 
comparative value agencies possess when it comes to deliberative process 
lies in rulemaking, not adjudication.155 For informal rulemaking, the APA 
requires that the agency provide the public with notice of the proposed rule 
and an opportunity to comment.156 The proposed rule has to reflect 
considered judgment through weighing regulatory alternatives, assessing the 
intended and unintended consequences, and making the data supporting its 
proposed rule publicly available.157 Before issuing the final rule, the agency 
must also respond to material comments and may well end up adjusting the 
final rule in light of those comments.158 Because the notice-and-comment 
process is public, Congress, the president, the media, and other interested 
groups can see what the agency is considering and raise concerns before the 
agency finalizes its rule.159 This is, of course, entirely different from the 
judicial process. 
More importantly, notice-and-comment rulemaking is nothing like the 
administrative adjudication process. As Professors Hickman and Nielson 
observe, “a process that solicits comments and forces agencies to engage 
with the views of the public should generally lead to better policy outcomes,” 
such that the agency’s comparative expertise at least partly “comes from the 
procedures that agencies are required to use.”160 In contrast, they argue, 
 
 155. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 965–68. 
 156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018). 
 157. In contrast to considered judgment,  
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Portland 
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the APA requires agencies 
to disclose the technical data and studies on which they relied to draft the proposed rule). 
 158. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An agency must consider 
and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 14–16 (2013). 
 160. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 966. 
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“[a]djudications typically involve only a narrow group of parties.”161 So as a 
matter of deliberative process, it is difficult to see any meaningful daylight 
between the judicial and administrative adjudicative processes. 
Professors Hickman and Nielson argue, moreover, that judicial 
deference-imbued policymaking through agency adjudication can raise due 
process concerns that rulemaking does not necessarily implicate.162 The 
problem is one of unfair notice created by the retroactive application of the 
policy created in the adjudication itself. To be sure, the Supreme Court held 
long ago in SEC v. Chenery Corp.163 that agencies, if permitted under their 
organic statutes, can choose to make policy through either adjudication or 
rulemaking.164 But that does not mean Chevron deference must apply to 
retroactive policies made through adjudication. Retroactivity should caution 
against such deference. Rulemaking, by contrast, is usually prospective.165 
And even when it is not, the agency still provides public notice of the 
proposed rule and must consider public comments before the rule becomes 
final—thus lessening the chance of unfair surprise to regulated parties.  
In fact, in Kisor, the Court expressly reaffirmed a narrowing of Auer’s 
domain in a similar fashion to exclude deference where the regulatory 
interpretation lacked fair notice, such as “an interpretation that would have 
imposed retroactive liability on parties for longstanding conduct that the 
agency had never before addressed.”166 These due process concerns may be 
even more pronounced in the immigration adjudication context, where 
liberty from detention and removal is implicated. This may explain—as 
Professor Michael Kagan argues—why the Supreme Court has refused to 
afford Chevron deference in the immigration adjudication context when the 
agency interpretations address detention or removal.167 Although beyond the 
scope of this Article, there are unique harms that can flow from the 
immediate and retroactive application of immigration adjudication 
 
 161. Id. at 967. 
 162. See id. at 971–77 (describing how adjudication can create policy that applies to past actions, 
implicating the Due Process Clause). 
 163. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 164. Id. at 202–03. 
 165. Any authority to enact retroactive rules is narrowly construed: 
  Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and 
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language 
requires this result. By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority 
will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive 
rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms. 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (citation omitted). 
 166. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019). 
 167. Kagan, supra note 23, at 495. 
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decisions—an application that may well precede a federal court ruling on 
whether the agency has it wrong or if Chevron deference is unwarranted. 
Indeed, the immigration adjudication context may even have less 
deliberative and fair process than traditional APA-governed formal 
adjudication or Article III judicial review. That is because immigration 
adjudication, as detailed in Part I.A, does not happen before an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Instead, it happens before an immigration 
judge in a setting with fewer procedural protections for the immigrants than 
in contexts where an ALJ presides.168 Also, the history of political hiring, 
firing, and reassignment of BIA members may affect their decisional 
independence. In June 2020, for example, BIA members appointed before 
the Trump administration were told they would be “reassigned” to other roles 
at DOJ after they rejected offers to leave the agency altogether.169 The 
practice of removing BIA members with differing political views is not new, 
tracing back to at least 2003 when the attorney general shrunk the BIA from 
sixteen to eleven members, firing the most “liberal” members on the 
Board.170 As one former BIA chair has put it, the BIA is “not a court 
anymore. It’s an enforcement mechanism . . . . They’re taking predetermined 
policy and just disguising it as judicial opinions, when the results have all 
been predetermined and it has nothing to do or little to do with the merits of 
the cases.”171 These kinds of hiring practices and the shift in adjudication 
from impartiality to predetermined policy hardly encourage a deliberative 
and fair process or an effective leveraging of agency expertise. Rather, they 
expose the predominant role of politics in immigration adjudication. Part 
II.C examines the proper role of politics in this area. 
 
 168. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–57 (comparing APA-governed formal 
adjudication with other administrative adjudications where a hearing is required by statute or regulation). 
 169. Tanvi Misra, DOJ ‘Reassigned’ Career Members of Board of Immigration Appeals, ROLL CALL 
(June 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/09/doj-reassigned-career-members-of-board-
of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/HJ53-CKVJ]. 
 170. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked To Leave; Critics 
Call It a ‘Purge,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
2003-mar-12-na-immig12-story.html [https://perma.cc/S2G5-8PKU]; see also DORSEY & WHITNEY 
LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
20–47 (2003), http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/DorseyStudyABA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJC5-
M8ZJ] (presenting findings regarding the 2002 “Procedural Reforms” at the BIA and including 
information garnered from interviews with past and present agency officials and individual immigration 
lawyers and groups).  
 171. Felipe de la Hoz, The Shadow Court Cementing Trump’s Immigration Policy, NATION (June 30, 
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-immigration-bia [https://perma.cc/D28L-
YLG3] (reporting the comments of Paul Wickham Schmidt, who chaired the BIA between 1995 and 
2001). 
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Another way to gauge the deliberative process is to assess its outputs. 
And the outputs in immigration adjudication do not portray a well-
functioning process, at least when it comes to consistency across similar 
cases. For example, grant rates vary widely among immigration judges. 
Empirical work by Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, 
and Philip Schrag reveals that asylum cases involving similarly relevant facts 
still create a “refugee roulette” depending on factors that include but are not 
limited to nationality, location, and judge.172 To illustrate, they found that  
in one regional asylum office, 60% of the officers decided in favor of 
Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by more than 50% from that 
region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers 
granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted 
asylum in as many as 68% of their cases.173 
TRAC Immigration has also produced empirical data that reveal the large 
degree to which outcomes in asylum cases depend on the immigration judge 
assigned to the case.174 
This agency disorder has not gone unnoticed by federal judges. 
Consider, for instance, Judge Richard Posner’s dissent in a case involving an 
immigration judge’s denial of a continuance to allow a key witness to appear: 
“Judges are not just umpires. Nor are the judicial officers of the Immigration 
Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Judicial activism is deplored 
but there is such a thing as excessive judicial passivity, which has been 
present at all levels of adjudication of Bouras’s case.”175 When interviewed 
about the logic of Chevron deference and the importance of federal courts, 
Judge Posner remarked,  
the performance of the immigration court and Board of Immigration 
Appeals is frequently appalling, and likewise in Social Security disability 
cases . . . . It would be a disaster to eliminate judicial review in immigration 
 
 172. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities 
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372–78 (2007) (using a database of judicial decisions and 
cross-referencing it to publicly available biographies of judges to identify correlations). 
 173. Id. at 296. 
 174. To illustrate the disparity in outcome in the same court depending on the immigration judge 
presiding in a given case, take the case of Newark immigration court: Between 2015-2020, denial rates 
ranged from 20.7% to 93.1%. Immigration Judge Reports, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/judgereports [https://perma.cc/N6FG-5CLQ].  
 175. Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also Cox, supra 
note 113, at 1679–80 (discussing Judge Posner’s various opinions concerning the ineptitude in the BIA, 
labeling the immigration courts’ decisions “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational, inconsistent, and 
uninformed” (footnotes omitted)). 
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and Social Security disability cases, and I imagine likewise in the cases 
decided by other federal administrative agencies.176 
External factors contribute to this lack of deliberative process, and thus 
the agency’s inability to leverage expertise via immigration adjudication. As 
discussed in Part I.A, immigrants placed in removal proceedings have no 
right to court-appointed counsel and might face an immigration judge alone. 
In turn, geography greatly influences access to counsel.177 Further, the 
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag study found:  
[T]he chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the 
random assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge, but also in 
very large measure by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by 
the gender of the immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work 
experience prior to appointment.178  
The ability to ensure a deliberative process is also undermined by the 
sheer volume of cases in the nation’s immigration courts, which at the time 
of this writing exceeds one million.179 And it is further exacerbated by the 
fact that immigration judges and BIA members face pressure to meet quotas 
 
 176. Cohen et al., supra note 117.  
 177. See generally Eagly & Shafer, supra note 55 (presenting empirical disparities in attorney 
resources along geographic lines); YOUSRA CHATTI & SARA FIRESTONE, CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. 
AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., DETAINED IMMIGRANTS AND ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (2019), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/PAFIUP%20Report%
20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5MX-CER2] (identifying how disparities in representation can be 
impacted by factors such as the distance between detention facilities and city centers). 
 178. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 172, at 296. 
 179. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics: Pending Cases, New Cases, 
and Total Completions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (July 14, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download [https://perma.cc/9H5A-ESPZ]; see also Sweeney, 
supra note 23, at 176 (“The immigration court system suffers from serious institutional capacity 
challenges that compromise its decisionmaking and limit the time and consideration it can give to any 
single case . . . . [T]he history of this dysfunction is longstanding . . . .” (footnote omitted)). To be sure, 
this Article does not advocate shifting these one million agency actions from adjudication to rulemaking. 
The number of cases designated as BIA precedent or a decision by the attorney general for which the 
Chevron framework applies is much lower. As noted in Part I.A, the attorney general issued fourteen 
certification rulings during the Trump administration, see supra note 84, and the BIA has issued fewer 
than one hundred precedential decisions during that same time period, see Volume 26, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/precedent-decisions-volume-
26 [https://perma.cc/KDS6-4SPW] (reporting two precedential BIA opinions issued after January 20, 
2017); Volume 27, supra note 69 (reporting seventy-four precedential BIA opinions issued between 
2017–2020); Volume 28, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-28 [https://perma.cc/4J8C-CNYU] (reporting fifteen precedential 
BIA opinions issued in 2020 and January 2021). Even fewer of these roughly thirty agency adjudication 
decisions per year would likely shift to rulemaking, as the agency would understandably pursue Chevron-
less case-by-case adjudication for some policymaking. 
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and follow guidelines set by the attorney general.180 Insofar as adjudicative 
decisionmaking is influenced by these factors, deliberative process and 
agency expertise are undermined if not abandoned. 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by comparison, contains many of the 
procedural features worthy of Chevron deference that immigration 
adjudication lacks. Even if rulemaking is imperfect, the process of drafting 
the rule, explaining the background, and soliciting input from the public 
creates a space for a rule to be finalized with much more technical or other 
expertise than what might flow from a BIA or attorney general adjudication. 
After all, intra-agency coordination among various agency experts is 
commonplace in the rule-drafting process,181 followed by the opportunity for 
robust public input during the notice-and-comment period. Further, as one 
of us (Wadhia) has argued, notice-and-comment rulemaking to establish 
immigration policy at the agency level—in contrast to adjudication—
advances important values of public acceptability or buy-in, greater 
consistency in outcomes, and widened transparency.182 Chevron’s political 
accountability theory, which the next Section examines, further implicates 
these values. 
C. Political Accountability 
In addition to expertise, the Chevron Court itself advanced the value of 
comparative political accountability as a reason for judicial deference. As 
the Chevron Court noted, “Judges are not experts in the field, and are not 
part of either political branch of the Government.”183 Agencies, by contrast, 
are part of a political branch, the executive, and report back to another 
political branch, Congress. “Courts must, in some cases,” the Court 
continued, “reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of 
 
 180. See AM. BAR ASS’N J., EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN, ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES (2018), https://
www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/03-30-2018_EOIR_-_PWP_Element_3_new.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M68D-L55H] (outlining new quotas for immigration judges and the number of cleared cases 
and decisions overturned on appeal rates to acquire a “satisfactory” rating), discussed in Lorelei Laird, 
Justice Department Imposes Quotas on Immigration Judges, Provoking Independence Concerns, AM. 
BAR ASS’N J. (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
justice_department_imposes_quotas_on_immigration_judges_provoking_independe [https://perma.cc/
7N3N-6P36]. 
 181. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 118, at 1034–48 (documenting the roles of legislative history and 
various agency actors in agency statutory interpretation).  
 182. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 26, at 152; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing 
Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 27–
32, 51–55, 57–64 (2012). 
 183. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
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the judges’ personal policy preferences.”184 A federal agency, on the other 
hand, “may, within the limits of that [congressional] delegation, properly 
rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments.”185 
Under the conventional account of Chevron’s political accountability 
theory, immigration adjudication might have a very strong claim to 
deference. After all, as noted in Parts I.A and II.A, the attorney general has 
final decisionmaking authority over decisions from immigration judges and 
the BIA. And the attorney general has exercised that authority, especially in 
recent years, to shape immigration policy at the agency level.186 The 
conventional account seems to have force because the attorney general is 
indisputably more politically accountable to the president and Congress than 
an Article III federal court could ever be. And deferring to the BIA and the 
attorney general would no doubt advance “the Chevron Court’s express 
objective to reduce partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.”187 
This conventional account, however, is incomplete on two related 
grounds. First, as discussed above, the inquiry here is not just about the 
comparative political accountability between agencies and courts but also 
between the modes of agency action—adjudication versus rulemaking. 
Policymaking through adjudication may not be an adequate substitute for 
rulemaking under an “elections matter” accountability theory. Second, 
political accountability should be viewed in broader terms of democratic 
accountability and legitimacy. Professor Jerry Mashaw has helpfully 
reframed the democratic legitimacy debate by distinguishing between two 
types of accountability: aggregative or electoral accountability, and 
deliberative accountability.188 He argues that American democracy melds 
these two distinct visions.189 Presidential administration can easily be 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See generally Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration 
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841 (2016) (documenting 
the history of the attorney general exercising powers over immigration policy); supra Parts I.A–II.A 
(describing the attorney general’s role in immigration adjudication). 
 187. Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1524. One of us (Walker) has advocated, and continues to 
believe, that Chevron’s critics “should more closely consider one significant and overlooked cost: such 
reform could result in partisanship playing a larger role in judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations.” Id. It just turns out, as discussed in Part II.D, that the overall benefits of eliminating 
Chevron in the immigration adjudication context outweigh these costs, especially when immigration 
rulemaking would still receive Chevron deference. 
 188. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 166–67 
(2018). 
 189. Id. at 14. 
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understood as advancing aggregative or electoral accountability in the 
administrative state.190 Yet, he argues, the administrative state can and 
should also advance deliberative accountability.191 
When framed in terms of deliberative accountability, one quickly sees 
how rulemaking better advances legitimacy than administrative 
adjudication. Professors Hickman and Nielson nicely capture this point: “A 
process that requires an agency to interact with broad segments of society 
and explain why it has acted in view of concerns raised by the general public, 
all else being equal, typically should yield more legitimate outcomes.”192 In 
other words, Chevron’s political accountability theory “presumably also 
comes from the procedures that agencies must use, in addition to the fact that 
elections have consequences.”193 As Professor Frankel explores, the attorney 
general’s referral and final decisionmaking process lacks the hallmarks of 
public engagement and transparency that are commonplace in notice-and-
comment rulemaking.194  
In sum, if the choice is between rulemaking and administrative 
adjudication in the immigration context, it is not a close call which mode of 
agency action garners more accountability and thus legitimacy. Both modes 
of agency action can advance aggregative or electoral accountability, but 
rulemaking is much better at advancing deliberative accountability. 
D. Uniformity in Law and the Overall Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A final, more recently developed rationale for Chevron deference is that 
it promotes national uniformity in federal law by limiting courts’ 
responsibility for determining the best reading of a statute. Professor Strauss 
is arguably the moving force behind this deference theory, contending that 
because courts need only assess the reasonableness of an agency’s 
interpretation, it is more likely that lower federal courts across the country 
will agree in accepting or rejecting the agency’s interpretation.195 In City of 
Arlington v. FCC,196 the Supreme Court recognized this “stabilizing purpose 
of Chevron”: unlike “[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-
circumstances test,” Chevron deference engenders predictability to agency 
 
 190. Id. at 167. 
 191. Id. at 167–70. 
 192. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 967. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See Frankel, supra note 85, at Part III.C. 
 195. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121–22 (1987) 
[hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases]. 
 196. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).  
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statutory interpretations and thus more uniformity in federal law.197 As an 
empirical matter, this uniformity rationale for Chevron deference has largely 
been borne out by decisions in the federal courts of appeals.198 
The importance of uniformity in law may be at its apex in federal 
immigration law. Uniformity is indisputably not better advanced through 
judicial interpretation than agency statutory interpretation—particularly in 
the modern era when the Supreme Court decides fewer than one hundred 
cases per year.199 But again, the comparison is not just between courts and 
agencies but between rulemaking and agency adjudication. As to the latter, 
the question is a closer call. Adjudication may allow the agency to move 
more swiftly to bring uniformity to federal immigration law, especially when 
the circuit courts have created inter-circuit disuniformity and the agency has 
a suitable case to decide the issue.200 Notice-and-comment rulemaking 
generally takes more time, so perhaps administrative adjudication—at least 
at the margins—better advances Chevron’s uniformity theory. This may be 
particularly true in the immigration adjudication context, where the attorney 
general can expeditiously exercise her referral-and-review authority to make 
the final decision for the agency.201 
That administrative adjudication may better advance uniformity in 
federal law than judicial review or even agency rulemaking, however, should 
not be overemphasized. No judge, member of Congress, or scholar likely 
views national uniformity as the exclusive theory for Chevron deference. 
 
 197. Id. at 307. 
 198. See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1525 (concluding that “our findings do suggest that 
Chevron creates a more favorable climate for nationwide uniformity that de novo or Skidmore review 
cannot match”). 
 199. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 195, at 1121 (suggesting “that it is helpful to 
view Chevron through the lens of the Supreme Court’s severely restricted capacity directly to enforce 
uniformity upon the courts of appeals in those courts’ review of agency decisionmaking”). In the October 
2019 term, the Supreme Court issued just fifty-three signed decisions—the fewest since 1862. Adam 
Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019 (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2020, 7:36 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2019 [https://perma.cc/LN83-
6JT2]. 
 200. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency 
construction.”).  
 201. To be sure, the fact that policymaking via rulemaking often takes more time and resources than 
policymaking via adjudication could result in immigration policy at the agency level regulating less 
conduct than the INA permits. Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the 
Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 495–97 (2020) (criticizing calls 
to eliminate Chevron deference as imposing an antiregulatory asymmetry in administrative law). At least 
in the immigration context, we do not view the costs of this potential underregulation to outweigh the 
various important benefits of narrowing Chevron’s domain to rulemaking that Part II details. 
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Instead, it is just one of at least four core rationales. And some may not even 
consider uniformity to be a reason for deference at all. At the very least, the 
costs and benefits of all relevant values should be weighed together. As 
discussed in Part II.A and as Professors Hickman and Nielson further 
elaborate, it is not a close question whether agency adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking best leverages expertise. This case study 
underscores how immigration rulemaking—as opposed to adjudication—
better leverages agency and public expertise, utilizes a more deliberative 
process, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, better promotes democratic 
accountability and public legitimacy.  
Indeed, if we were pressed to weigh just the last two values—
accountability and uniformity—agency rulemaking would come out ahead 
over administrative adjudication in the immigration context. When the first 
two values are considered, the case against Chevron deference in 
immigration adjudication becomes so clear as to justify some course 
correction to narrow Chevron’s domain. Part III turns to how to go about that 
reform. 
III.  HOW TO NARROW CHEVRON’S IMMIGRATION DOMAIN 
Part II demonstrated how Chevron’s theoretical foundation is 
particularly weak in the immigration adjudication context, arguably weaker 
there than in many other administrative adjudications where a hearing is 
required by statute or regulation. The case to narrow Chevron’s domain in 
the immigration context to just notice-and-comment rulemaking seems quite 
compelling as a normative and theoretical matter. The resulting question is 
how to bring about this reform. This Part focuses on three paths: the Supreme 
Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch itself. 
A. The Supreme Court and Stare Decisis 
In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Hickman and 
Nielson powerfully argue that the Supreme Court should narrow Chevron’s 
domain to exclude judicial deference for some, if not all, agency statutory 
interpretations created via administrative adjudication.202 Assuming the 
Court agrees that Chevron’s foundation is unsound in the immigration 
adjudication context, stare decisis is still a potent constraint. Hickman and 
Nielson argue, however, that stare decisis should not control here, for three 
reasons.  
 
 202. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at Parts II–III. 
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First, they argue that the stare decisis claim is particularly weak in the 
adjudication context because the Supreme Court has seldom applied 
Chevron deference to adjudication, as opposed to rulemaking. Second, the 
other traditional factors—the low reliance interests, the judge-made nature 
of the doctrine, and the doctrine’s incorrectness in the adjudication context—
do not support keeping the precedent. Third, various changed circumstances 
in the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence—namely, that an agency 
statutory interpretation can now trump a prior judicial interpretation and that 
the Court has reiterated fair notice principles and retroactivity concerns in 
administrative law—counsel revisiting Chevron deference in the 
adjudication context.203 
Fully assessing Professors Hickman and Nielson’s stare decisis 
arguments exceeds this Article’s scope. But they present a compelling 
case—one that seems to apply with similar force in the immigration 
adjudication context. Litigants, scholars, and lower courts will surely 
develop their argument further, and it merits serious attention from the 
Supreme Court in an appropriate case.204 For the reasons presented in this 
Article, immigration adjudication is arguably the best context within which 
 
 203. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Randy Kozel advances a different argument 
for why stare decisis should pose no barrier to overruling the Chevron decision if the doctrine is based on 
a theory of congressional delegation: the precedent’s “combination of exceptional breadth and intrusion 
upon interpretive choice places Chevron [as currently theorized] beyond the domain of stare decisis.” 
Randy J. Kozel, Retheorizing Precedent, 70 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1055 (2021).  
 204. Although scholars and judges may well reasonably disagree about the pull of statutory stare 
decisis in this context, one of us (Walker) is not convinced that overturning this statutory precedent would 
be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. Cf. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified 
Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856–63 (2018) (defending qualified 
immunity for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on statutory stare decisis grounds). To be sure, as 
a matter of first principles, Chevron deference is likely not a proper interpretation of § 706 of the APA, 
for many of the reasons articulated by Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive 
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 985–94 (2017). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 1613, 1641–57 (2019) (defending Chevron as a statutory precedent). And, Part II argued, the 
normative case against Chevron in immigration adjudication is compelling. Despite these considerations, 
Chevron has been the law generally since 1984 and in the immigration adjudication context specifically 
since at least 1987, with the Court reaffirming the precedent numerous times. See supra Part I.B. 
Importantly, moreover, there is strong evidence that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the 
Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 118, at 995 (finding that the congressional 
staffers surveyed “displayed a greater awareness of Chevron by name than of any other canon in our 
study”). And the Court has recognized a strong presumption against administrative law exceptionalism 
when interpreting the APA. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 243–50 (2014) (arguing that the APA sets the default standards 
for judicial review of agency action when an agency’s organic statute does not provide its own standard 
of review); cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 583, 584–92 (2017) (detailing how immigration law is already exceptional at the constitutional 
law level).  
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courts and litigants can build the case for narrowing Chevron’s domain in 
the adjudication context. 
B. Congress and Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
The Supreme Court, of course, is not the only actor with the power to 
narrow Chevron’s domain. The Court has emphasized that “[a]ll our 
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become part of 
the statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional change.”205 
As noted in the Introduction, Republicans in recent years have proposed 
legislation to amend the APA to eliminate Chevron deference entirely.206 We 
highly doubt such sweeping legislative proposals will garner the requisite 
bipartisan support any time soon. And we are not convinced that eliminating 
Chevron deference for all agency statutory interpretations would make for 
good policy.  
But what Congress should do is surgically remove Chevron deference 
for agency statutory interpretations made in immigration adjudications yet 
preserve it for immigration interpretations promulgated via notice-and-
comment rulemaking. For the former category of agency action, Congress 
should not command de novo review but instead replace Chevron with the 
less deferential Skidmore standard, which instructs courts to give weight to 
administrative interpretations of law based on the “thoroughness evident in 
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”207 This shift from Chevron 
to Skidmore, as Professor Strauss explains, is an important move from a 
binding policymaking “space” where the agency’s reasoning does not matter 
as much, to a nonbinding “weight” where the agency’s position prevails to 
the extent it reflects special expertise.208  
This legislative change, moreover, would not be made to the APA 
“superstatute” that governs the entire regulatory state.209 Instead, Congress 
should amend the judicial review provisions of the INA. A provision that 
narrows Chevron’s domain to just rulemaking under the INA could be a 
minor detail as part of a larger immigration reform bill. And it should garner 
 
 205. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).  
 206. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 207. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 208. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012). 
 209. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 
1207, 1209 (2015). 
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at least some bipartisan support—from Republicans who have long called 
for the elimination of Chevron generally and from Democrats and 
Republicans who appreciate the normative case against Chevron deference 
in immigration adjudication in particular. 
Such legislative reform would not be unprecedented. As Professor 
Barnett details, Congress similarly “codified Chevmore” when it enacted the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.210 
There, Congress targeted the judicial deference the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (“OCC”) receives for its decisions that federal law preempts 
state consumer financial laws. For OCC interpretations preempting state law, 
Congress replaced Chevron with Skidmore.211 And it included a savings 
clause to make clear that the OCC should continue to receive Chevron 
deference for all other statutory interpretations.212 Congress could similarly 
codify Chevmore in the immigration adjudication context by, for instance, 
amending the INA’s standard-of-review provisions for removal orders.213 
As Professor Barnett explores in greater detail, through Chevmore 
codification “Congress can provide a ‘Chevron reward’ or a ‘Skidmore 
penalty’ in light of agency behavior.”214 By shifting to the less deferential 
Skidmore standard for immigration adjudication, the BIA and attorney 
general will face greater incentives to exercise expertise, engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking, and perhaps “play it safer” when interpreting the INA via 
adjudication.215 After all, Skidmore focuses judicial review on the agency’s 
exercise of expertise and reasoned decisionmaking.216 Failure to do so would 
risk judicial invalidation of the agency’s statutory interpretation. To provide 
one empirical snapshot, a study of all circuit court decisions citing Chevron 
during an eleven-year period showed agency interpretations were 
significantly more likely to prevail under Chevron (77.4 percent) than 
Skidmore (56.0 percent).217 
 
 210. Barnett, supra note 28, at 10, 22–33. 
 211. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2018) (instructing the reviewing court to “assess the validity of 
[the OCC Comptroller’s] determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration 
of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, [and] the consistency with other valid 
determinations made by the agency”).  
 212. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(B). 
 213. See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2018) (detailing the scope and standard of review 
for judicial review of removal orders). 
 214. Barnett, supra note 28, at 51. 
 215. Cf. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1384 (2013) (“The chance of 
receiving more stringent review gives agencies an incentive to ‘play it safer’ when interpreting statutes 
than they otherwise might.”). 
 216. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 217. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 30 fig.1. 
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Because an agency is more likely to prevail in court under Chevron than 
Skidmore, DOJ will also face incentives to move major policymaking out of 
adjudication and into notice-and-comment rulemaking, where the agency 
would still receive the Chevron reward. Not only does this channel 
immigration policymaking at the agency level to the more publicly 
transparent and accountable rulemaking process, but it also encourages 
Congress to play a larger role in the development of immigration law and 
policy. As Professor Barnett astutely concludes, “Chevmore codification, 
like appropriations, congressional oversight, sunset provisions, and 
confirmation for agency officers, becomes another tool for congressional 
oversight of agency action.”218 
C. The Executive Branch and Internal Administrative Law 
Narrowing Chevron’s domain in the immigration context does not 
require judicial or congressional action. The Executive Branch can do it 
unilaterally. The Supreme Court famously held in Chenery in 1947 that “the 
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc 
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the 
administrative agency.”219 To be sure, there may be in certain circumstances 
“a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory 
standards.”220 The Chenery Court identified three: (1) “problems may arise 
in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, 
problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general 
rule”; (2) “the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a 
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard 
and fast rule”; or (3) “the problem may be so specialized and varying in 
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general 
rule.”221 
As Part II.A highlights, these circumstances will likely not present 
themselves often in the immigration context. And when they do, the BIA and 
attorney general should not categorically avoid utilizing adjudication to 
engage in “case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”222 Instead, the 
 
 218. Barnett, supra note 28, at 56. 
 219. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“Even apart from the Administrative Procedure 
Act this Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was 
basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility 
for substantive judgments.”). 
 220. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203. 
 221. Id. at 202–03. 
 222. See id. 
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argument here is that the Executive Branch—through the attorney general 
and DHS secretary—should shift the default to rulemaking for immigration 
policymaking.223 And when it is necessary to engage in adjudicative 
policymaking, the attorney general should not seek Chevron deference for 
those statutory interpretations but instead should ask the court to review the 
agency’s interpretation under the less deferential Skidmore standard—or 
perhaps seek no deference at all.  
To be sure, whether an agency can waive Chevron deference is hotly 
contested, with Justices Breyer and Gorsuch both suggesting last year that 
Chevron is waivable.224 Even if a court will not honor Chevron waiver, an 
agency can still choose to adjudicate with the assumption that Chevron does 
not apply. There is some, albeit limited, empirical support for the common-
sense intuition that agencies are less aggressive or more faithful to their 
statutory mandates if they believe their statutory interpretations will not 
receive Chevron deference.225 And, as one of us (Walker) has counseled 
elsewhere, when waiving Chevron deference, the agency “should not hold 
back on its Skidmore analysis” but “utilize its ‘full panoply of Skidmore 
reasoning.’”226 In other words, the agency should not only waive Chevron 
 
 223. Currently, the attorney general and the DHS secretary hold immigration policymaking authority. 
See INA § 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall establish such 
regulations, . . . review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such 
authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying 
out this section.”); INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (charging the DHS Secretary “with the 
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and 
naturalization of aliens,” but providing “[t]hat determination and ruling by the Attorney General with 
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling”). 
 224. See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (writing for the majority, 
Justice Breyer noted that “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the 
Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute”); Guedes v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement regarding 
the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit was “mistaken” to hold that Chevron is not waivable 
and observing that “[t]his Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government 
fails to invoke it”); see also, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 183, 184 (2019) (arguing against waiver); Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving 
Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927, 1930 (2018) (same); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 1520 (2019) (same). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 (2020) (summarizing the current debate in the federal courts on Chevron deference 
waiver). 
 225. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 722–24, 722 fig.3 (2014) (reporting that two in five rule drafters surveyed agreed 
or strongly agreed—with another two in five somewhat agreeing—that a federal agency is more 
“aggressive” in its interpretive efforts if it is confident Chevron deference applies, as opposed to the less 
deferential Skidmore standard or de novo review).  
 226. Christopher J. Walker, How To Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73, 80 (2013) 
(quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
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deference; it should adjudicate in a way that would be more likely to 
withstand judicial scrutiny under Skidmore. 
The Executive Branch should go further than just reforming how it 
makes policy via immigration adjudication. It should commit to shifting 
major immigration policymaking away from adjudication and into the realm 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The agency can commit to this new 
process, without a congressional or judicial command, via its discretion to 
create internal administrative law.227 Indeed, DOJ recently codified a similar 
procedural-channeling and deference-limiting internal law in the context of 
agency guidance and Auer deference to agency regulatory interpretations. In 
an interim final rule promulgated in August 2020, DOJ set forth a number of 
rules and procedures for creating agency guidance documents and instructed 
that “[t]he Department shall not seek deference [in litigation] to any guidance 
document issued by the Department or any component after the effective 
date of this rule that does not substantially comply with the[se] 
requirements.”228 
At the same time, the president and Congress need not stand by, waiting 
for this internal administrative law to develop organically. The president 
should insist on this internal reform of anyone nominated to serve as attorney 
general, and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee can and should 
extract this commitment from the nominee as part of the confirmation 
process.229 An early commitment by the attorney general to shift major 
immigration policy to informal rulemaking will encourage a shift internally. 
Moreover, legislating Chevmore for immigration adjudication would create 
additional “Chevron rewards” to incentivize the Executive Branch to make 
major immigration policy through rulemaking.  
 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1143 n.179 
(2008)). 
 227. Internal administrative law broadly includes all “measures governing agency functioning that 
are created within the agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government personnel,” 
Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1251 
(2017), all of which “share the fundamental characteristic of being implemented from inside of agencies 
to control their actions and operations,” Christopher J. Walker & Rebecca Turnbull, Operationalizing 
Internal Administrative Law, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1225, 1231 (2020).  
 228. Processes and Procedures for Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,200, 
63,202 (Oct. 7, 2020) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 229. The president demanding this change in internal administrative law is consistent with Professor 
Ming Hsu Chen’s call that the president should be the administrator-in-chief. See Ming H. Chen, 
Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 
347, 351 (2017) (“The normative theory of the Administrator-in-Chief is that the President is most 
justified when bolstering administrative procedure, with the effect of enhancing perceptions of legitimacy 
by the agency officials who implement them, and increasing their policy effectiveness.”). 
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As Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack observe, “[t]he 
constraints imposed by internal administrative law will be critical in resisting 
unlawful or excessive assertions of administrative power now, just as they 
have been in the past.”230 Shifting from adjudication to rulemaking for 
immigration policymaking at the agency level is just one more example of 
the virtues of internal administrative law.231 
CONCLUSION 
When then-Judge Gorsuch remarked that Chevron deference is the 
“elephant in the room,”232 many suspected that Gorsuch was joining the call 
to eliminate Chevron deference entirely. That was certainly the mood, at 
least from the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee at Gorsuch’s 
confirmation hearing. But a closer look at the immigration context in which 
Gorsuch expressed those concerns reveals that the theoretical foundations 
for Chevron deference are perhaps most precarious with respect to 
immigration adjudication. And narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to 
just rulemaking would not have the “titanic real-world implications on all 
aspects of our everyday lives” that the senators worried about at Gorsuch’s 
confirmation.233 To the contrary, shifting the default from adjudication to 
rulemaking to establish federal immigration policy would be more consistent 
with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to leverage agency expertise, to 
engage in a deliberative process, and to increase political accountability. 
In the lead article in this Symposium, Professors Hickman and Nielson 
call on the Supreme Court to reconsider Chevron’s domain when it comes to 
 
 230. Metzger & Stack, supra note 227, at 1248. 
 231. This shift to rulemaking in the immigration context should not be interpreted as granting a blank 
check to the agency. Chevron deference still requires a court to find the statute “genuinely ambiguous” 
and the agency’s interpretation “reasonable”—inquiries the Court has emphasized are exacting. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019). Moreover, the rulemaking must withstand arbitrary and 
capricious review under the APA, which the Court in recent years has suggested is a much “harder look” 
than those APA terms may suggest. Christopher J. Walker, What the Census Case Means for 
Administrative Law: Harder Look Review?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-census-case-means-for-administrative-law-harder-look-review 
[https://perma.cc/ZX9U-7C67]; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. 
Ct. 1891, 1913–16 (2020) (holding that the APA requires the agency to consider regulatory alternatives 
and reliance interests); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (holding that per 
the APA’s “reasoned explanation requirement,” an agency must “offer genuine justifications for 
important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public”); Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983) (articulating the APA’s reasoned 
decisionmaking requirement). 
 232. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 233. Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); see supra 
notes 4–8 and accompanying text. 
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administrative adjudication. Such judicial attention is merited, especially 
with respect to immigration adjudication where the lack of agency expertise 
and deliberative process is glaring. But it is a mistake to focus only on courts 
when it comes to immigration law and policy. The political branches can and 
should act. Comprehensive immigration reform should be a legislative 
priority, and Chevmore codification in the INA should garner bipartisan 
support as part of any such proposal. But the Executive Branch need not wait 
for Congress. The attorney general, under the president’s direction if 
necessary, can and should embrace this reform internally—by waiving 
Chevron deference in immigration adjudication and by turning to rulemaking 
instead of adjudication to make major changes to immigration law and policy 
at the agency level. 
